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The Chilcot Report 
Some Thoughts on International Law and Legal Advice 
James A Green and Stephen Samuel 
 
Abstract 
The Report of the Iraq (Chilcot) Inquiry was finally published, 7 years after the 
Inquiry’s creation, on 6 July 2016.  The scope of the Inquiry’s work was vast, and this 
was reflected in the enormous size of its final Report.  The publication of the Report 
thus raises a multitude of questions requiring further analysis.  In this short article, we 
aim to contribute some initial thoughts, immediately following the Report’s publication, 
in just two (interrelated) areas.  First, we comment on the role of international law in 
the Chilcot Inquiry.  To what extent was international law considered and how was it 
presented in the Report?  We also ask whether the Report reaches any implicit 
substantive legal conclusions, despite formally refraining from determinations of law.  
Secondly, we review the Inquiry’s findings concerning international legal advice and 
legal advisers.  In particular, we contribute some thoughts on the Report’s treatment of 
questions relating to the appropriate recipients of legal advice and its transparency, the 
timeliness of advice, the perception and treatment of law and legal advice by the 
Government, and the independence and quality of that advice. 
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1. Introduction 
The Iraq Inquiry – commonly known as the Chilcot Inquiry, after its chairperson, Sir John 
Chilcot – was announced on 15 June 2009 by then UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown,1 and 
was formally launched on 30 July 2009.2  It was constituted as a non-statutory inquiry,3 to 
independently ‘consider the period from summer 2001, before military operations began in 
March 2003, and [the UK’s] subsequent involvement in Iraq right up to the end of July [2009].’4   
The Inquiry was an enormous undertaking in many respects.  According to its own cost 
analysis, its total expenditure from 2009 to the publication of its Report was £10,375,000.5  Its 
work spanned 7 years; the publication of its Report was, of course, controversially and 
repeatedly delayed.6  The Chilcot Report was finally published on 6 July 2016.7  It comprised 
twelve volumes (as well as an executive summary) and, famously, ran to over 2.6 million 
words.8 
Given the scope of the Inquiry’s work, not to mention the sheer size of its final Report, 
there exist a vast number of questions that require further analysis post-publication.  Our aim 
                                                 
1 HC Deb (15 June 2009) Hansard, vol 494, 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090615/debtext/90615-0004.htm. 
2 Iraq Inquiry Launched (30 July 2009) www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-inquiry/news-archive/2009/2009-07-30-
opening/. 
3 In the UK a clear distinction is drawn between ‘statutory’ and ‘non-statutory’ inquiries, with most of the former 
usually being set up under the Inquiries Act 2005 (c.12).  See Select Committee on the Inquiries Act 2005, House 
of Lords, Report of Session 2013–14, The Inquiries Act 2005: Post-Legislative Scrutiny (The Stationery Office 
Limited 2014).  As a non-statutory inquiry, Chilcot retained a notable degree of independent discretion and 
procedural flexibility.  See Stephen Samuel and James A Green, ‘Domestic Commissions of Inquiry and 
International Law: The Importance of Normative Authority’ in Christian Henderson (ed), Commissions of Inquiry: 
Problems and Prospects (Hart Publishing forthcoming 2017). 
4 Hansard (15 June 2009) (n 1). 
5 Inquiry Costs, www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-inquiry/inquiry-costs/ (setting out a full financial breakdown). 
6 See, e.g., Stephanie Boland, ‘What Do We Know about the Chilcot Inquiry Report, and When Will it be 
Published?’ New Statesman (16 May 2016) www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2016/05/what-do-we-know-
about-chilcot-inquiry-report-and-when-will-it-be-published; and ‘Chilcot Iraq Inquiry: MPs to Debate Report 
Delays’ BBC News (13 January 2015) www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-30788981. 
7 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry (Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors), 6 July 2016 (Chilcot Inquiry), 
www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report (comprising twelve volumes and executive summary). 
8 Indeed, it has quickly become a common media trope to point out that the report is ‘four times the length of War 
and Peace’.  See Emily Allen, ‘Chilcot Inquiry: What is It and What Did the Iraq War Report Say?’ The Telegraph 
(5 July 2016) www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/28/chilcot-inquiry-when-is-the-report-being-published-and-
why-has-i/. 
  
3 
 
is extremely modest in comparison to the scale of the Inquiry.  In this article, we wish to 
contribute to one area of discussion, which has already begun in the media and international 
law blogosphere since the Report was released.9  This discussion has two interrelated 
dimensions.  First, we comment on the role of international law in the Chilcot Inquiry and, 
secondly, we consider the Inquiry’s conclusions concerning international legal advice and legal 
advisers.  Our focus in this paper is not on substantive legal issues per se. In particular, we 
deliberately side-step the question of whether the intervention of Iraq in 2003 was lawful or 
unlawful.  This is partly because that ad bellum question has been significantly, and 
continuingly, evaluated elsewhere since late-2002.10  Furthermore, the Chilcot Inquiry’s 
mandate did not allow for it to reach formal legal determinations, and its Report made it explicit 
that it did not do so.11  
While the Inquiry did not make legal conclusions, the topic of international law was 
significant and manifested itself in various ways during the Inquiry’s 7-year odyssey.  In 
particular, the Chilcot Report engaged in detail with the process of legal advice and decision-
making in relation to the Iraq intervention and its aftermath.  Given space constraints and a 
desire to provide timely commentary (at the time of writing, the Report was released just 16 
days ago), our present aim is not to embark on a complete description of the contemporary 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Elizabeth Wilmshurst, ‘We Ignored the Rule of Law – The Result was Iraq’ The Guardian (6 July 
2016) www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/07/ignored-rule-law-war-result-was-iraq-un-charter-
foreign-office-lawyer-2003?CMP=fb_gu; Jamie Doward and Chris Ames, ‘Whitehall’s Secret Advice on Chilcot 
Will Not be Released’ The Observer (9 July 2016) www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/09/whitehall-holds-
back-official-advice-on-iraq-war; Oona Hathaway, ‘What the Chilcot Report Teaches Us About National Security 
Lawyering’ Just Security (11 July 2016) www.justsecurity.org/31946/chilcot-report-teaches-national-security-
lawyering/; John Bellinger, ‘The Chilcot Inquiry and the Legal Basis for the Iraq War’ Lawfare (11 July 2016) 
www.lawfareblog.com/chilcot-inquiry-and-legal-basis-iraq-war; and Marko Milanovic, ‘A Rejoinder to John 
Bellinger on the Chilcot Report’ EJIL:Talk! (13 July 2016) www.ejiltalk.org/a-rejoinder-to-john-bellinger-on-
the-chilcot-report/. 
10 See Charlotte Peevers, The Politics of Justifying Force: The Suez Crisis, the Iraq War, and International Law 
(Oxford University Press 2013) 196 (‘the debate [as to the legality of the use of force in Iraq] still rages over ten 
years after the invasion…’).  See, e.g., Dominic McGoldrick, From ‘9-11’ to the Iraq War 2003 (Hart 2004) 47-
86; Lindsay Moir, Reappraising the Resort to Force: International Law, Jus ad Bellum and the War on Terror 
(Hart 2010) 73-106; and Marc Weller, Iraq and the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press 
2010) particularly 132-88. 
11 For discussion, see n 13 – n 17 and accompanying text. 
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procedures of international legal advice and governmental decision-making.12 Rather, we 
simply reflect upon certain aspects of the manner in which the Chilcot Inquiry engaged with 
and represented international law and legal advice. 
 
2. The Chilcot Inquiry and International Law 
A. The Role of International Law in the Work of the Inquiry 
At first glance, international law was seemingly excluded as an element of the Chilcot Inquiry’s 
work from the outset.  Gordon Brown’s announcement of the Inquiry’s creation, for example, 
avoided any reference whatsoever to ‘law’ or ‘legality’, in preference of more generic language 
regarding the ‘controversial’ nature of the 2003 intervention.13  Sir John Chilcot’s July 2009 
launch statement made it clear that ‘[t]he Inquiry is not a court of law and nobody is on trial.’14  
It was thus unsurprising that the 2016 Report stressed in its Introduction that ‘[t]he Inquiry has 
not expressed a view as to whether or not the UK’s participation in the conflict was lawful.’15 
It is not uncommon for the mandates of domestic commissions of inquiry to preclude 
the commission in question from making formal legal determinations.16  The Chilcot Inquiry 
was primarily concerned with the extent to which one may regard the UK officials concerned 
as being well-informed to make judgments and decisions, rather than ascertaining which 
                                                 
12 For a short synopsis of legal advice in the UK, see, Stephen Samuel, ‘British Influences on the ‘Ideals’ of 
International Lawyers’ in Robert McCorquodale and Jean-Pierre Gauci (eds), British Influences on International 
Law, 1915-2015 (Brill Nijhoff 2016).  For more expansive studies in this area, see Andraž Zidar and Jean-Pierre 
Gauci (eds), The Role of Legal Advisers in International Law (Brill Nijhoff forthcoming 2016); and Chanaka 
Wickremasinghe (ed), The International Lawyer As Practitioner (British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law 2000). 
13 Hansard (15 June 2009) (n 1) col 27. 
14 Statement by Sir John Chilcot, Chairman of the Iraq Inquiry, at a news conference on Thursday, 30 July 2009 
(30 July 2009) www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-inquiry/news-archive/2009/2009-07-30-opening/statement-by-sir-
john-chilcot-chairman-of-the-iraq-inquiry-at-a-news-conference-on-thursday-30-july-2009/.  See also Karen N 
Scott and Natalie Baird, ‘Preface’ (2009) 7 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law ix, ix. 
15 Chilcot Report (n 7) introduction [99-100].  See also Statement by Sir John Chilcot: 6 July 2016 (6 July 2016) 
www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/247010/2016-09-06-sir-john-chilcots-public-statement.pdf, 4. 
16 See Samuel and Green (n 3) section V. 
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judgment or decision was objectively better.  It is notable that none of the Inquiry’s members 
were lawyers (let alone international lawyers).17  
The decision to restrict the Inquiry’s mandate to exclude legal determinations, and – 
particularly – the post-Report refusal to release information regarding the selection criteria that 
led to it being composed exclusively of non-lawyers, has been subject to revived criticism 
following the Report’s publication.18  However, this criticism may, to an extent at least, be 
unwarranted.  This is partly because it is debatable whether it would have been desirable or 
feasible for the Inquiry to make formal legal pronouncements as to the (ill)legality of the war. 
It is tempting for international lawyers to view determinations on substantive 
international law in commissions of inquiry as being inherently ‘positive’, especially when the 
commission in question is dealing with ‘fundamental’ legal issues (such as human rights or, 
say, the use of military force), and especially given that such a commission may well be the 
most formal and ‘authoritative’ forum in which international law standards could be considered 
in relation to the given factual circumstances – as was undoubtedly the case for the UK’s 
involvement in the Iraq War.19   
However, as the present authors have argued elsewhere,20 it is a mistake to view it as 
inherently desirable that commissions of inquiry reach substantive international legal 
determinations.  This is because, in many instances, such commissions will not possess the 
requisite normative authority (given, in particular, the often complex social contexts in which 
they operate) to be suitable forums for this.21  As such, it is questionable whether the Chilcot 
                                                 
17 See Chilcot Report (n 7) introduction [99].  For biographies of the members of the Inquiry, see The Committee, 
www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-inquiry/the-committee/. 
18 See, e.g., Doward and Ames (n 9) (referencing criticism in this regard from Professor Phillipe Sands). 
19 See Chilcot Report (n 7) volume 5, section 5 [579-81]. 
20 Samuel and Green (n 3). 
21 There are various examples of commissions of inquiry – particularly domestic commissions of inquiry – 
attempting to engage in international legal analysis without possessing the requisite international law expertise: a 
representative example is the findings of the Malaysian Commission on Immigrants in Sabah (2012-2014) 
concerning refugee status and on the status of stateless persons, which were wholly unsatisfactory.  See Report of 
the Commission of Enquiry on Immigrants in Sabah, presented to Seri Paduka Baginda Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
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Inquiry could, or should, have reached substantive legal conclusions, especially given the form 
in which it was constituted.22 
The critique of the Inquiry’s engagement with international law also somewhat 
overlooks the fact that, while it was not the Inquiry’s role to apply international law, the Report 
did engage with it.  Despite initial appearances, international law was certainly not side-lined: 
indeed, it was seen as crucial.  As Sir John Chilcot stated in a letter to Sir Gus O’Donnell (then 
Cabinet Secretary) in January 2011, ‘the legal basis for military action and the way in which 
this developed [is] a central part of the Inquiry’s work.’23   
It will, of course, be recalled that within a few months of its establishment, the Inquiry 
had appointed Dame Rosalyn Higgins to advise on matters of international law.24  It also went 
on to solicit submissions from international lawyers in 2010,25 all 37 of which have now been 
published on the Inquiry’s website.26  In its Report, the Inquiry made it clear that Dame 
Rosalyn’s input contributed directly to the Inquiry’s procedures and conclusions throughout,27 
and that the solicited international law submissions ‘inform[ed] its consideration of legal 
issues.’28   
                                                 
(3 December 2014) www.sapp.org.my/rci/RCI-Eng.pdf, 227-9.  For further discussion of this and other similar 
examples, see Samuel and Green (n 3). 
22 Of course, it is certainly possible for domestic commissions of inquiry to reach credible and informed 
substantive conclusions of international law.  Indeed, the 2010 independent Dutch Committee of Inquiry on the 
War in Iraq (Davids Committee) did just this in relation to the Iraq War.  See, e.g., Rapport Commissie-Davids, 
Rijksoverheid (Dutch Government) (12 January 2010) 
www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/rapporten/2010/01/12/rapport-commissie-
davids/rapport-commissie-irak.pdf, 530-1 [20].  See also Wilmshurst (n 9). 
23 Letter Sir John Chilcot to Sir Gus O’Donnell (6 January 2011) www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/96297/2011-01-
06-Letter-Chilcot-to-ODonnell.pdf. 
24 Military and International Law Advisers Appointed (13 October 2009) www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-
inquiry/news-archive/2009/2009-10-13-advisers-appointed/. 
25 The Iraq Inquiry Invites Submissions from International Lawyers (2 June 2010) www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-
inquiry/news-archive/2010/2010-06-02-submissions-from-international-lawyers/. 
26 International Law Submissions, www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/other-material/submissions-international-law/. 
27 Chilcot Report (n 7) introduction [10]. 
28 ibid [98]. 
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A perusal of the published communications to and from the Inquiry29 indicates that well 
over 100 of them explicitly, in some measure, refer to questions of international law (and this, 
of course, does not take into the hundreds of other documents that have been published by the 
Inquiry).  This quantitative inspection is merely indicative, of course: there is a further need to 
consider the Inquiry’s engagement with international law in more qualitative terms. 
 
B. Legal Inferences from the Chilcot Report 
Post-publication, it has been tentatively suggested that, while the Chilcot Inquiry did not 
explicitly reach legal conclusions, such conclusions could be inferred from its Report,30 or, at 
least, that the Report came ‘as close is it [could] to saying that the war was unlawful’.31  One 
could certainly seize the opportunity to extrapolate legal opinions from the Report: its 2.6 
million words offer fertile ground for this. 
For example, the Inquiry’s conclusion that Tony Blair’s public statements in January 
2003 ‘were at odds with the draft advice he had received and discussed with Lord Goldsmith’32 
is suggestively left hanging, as are various statements made in 2002 by Kofi Annan – the UN 
Secretary-General at the time – as to the legal need for unequivocal Security Council 
authorisation for any inter-state use of force.33   
Elsewhere, the Report strongly gives the impression that the Inquiry shared the 
consensus position that the right of self-defence could not have provided a legal justification 
for the use of force.34  This view – had it been made as a statement of law – would hardly have 
                                                 
29 This review was conducted on behalf of the authors by April Longstaffe: her research assistance was funded by 
the ESRC ‘Commissions of Inquiry: Problems and Prospects’ project.  The dataset is on file with the authors. 
30 See, e.g., Caroline Lucas, ‘Chilcot Report: Evidence of Deception and Illegality’ Caroline Lucas MP, Blog (6 
July 2016) www.carolinelucas.com/latest/chilcot-report-evidence-of-deception-and-illegality. 
31 John Rentoul, ‘Is Sir John Chilcot Really Saying that Tony Blair Should Have Told the Spies He Didn’t Believe 
Them?’ The Independent (6 July 2016) www.independent.co.uk/voices/chilcot-inquiry-report-iraq-war-tony-
blair-should-have-told-spies-he-didnt-believe-them-a7122536.html. 
32 Chilcot Report (n 7) volume 5, section 5 [208].  See also ibid [219]. 
33 ibid, volume 3, section 3.4 [531-3].  
34 ibid, volume 5, section 5 [199]. 
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been controversial.  After all, even the most advent advocates of intervention within the UK 
and US governments at the time ultimately decided to steer clear of the self-defence argument 
in favour of the ‘revival’ argument.35  However, again, the Inquiry was careful not to offer an 
explicit legal opinion in this regard itself, instead simply noting that there was ‘consistent and 
unambiguous’ legal advice pointing in that direction.36   
The same is true of the Report’s consideration of the Government’s efforts to comply 
with International Humanitarian Law in relation to target selection.  The Report commended 
these efforts, but stopped short of confirming that they actually met with success.37  Perhaps 
most starkly,38 the Report concluded that  
[t]he UK Government was claiming to act on behalf of the international community “to 
uphold the authority of the Security Council”, knowing that it did not have a majority 
in the Security Council in support of its actions.  In those circumstances, the UK’s 
actions undermined the authority of the Security Council.39 
Given that the UK’s avowed legal basis for the action for the intervention was ultimately 
Chapter VII authorisation – and, indeed, given that this was the only (even potentially) credible 
legal basis for that action40 – it could be inferred that the Inquiry concluded that the UK’s use 
of force was unlawful, and that this was its diplomatic way of saying so.  However, the finding 
could just as easily be read as indicating that international law was ‘complied with’ in general, 
but that this nonetheless undermined the authority of the Security Council.   
The present authors are wary of second-guessing unexpressed conclusions on the part 
of the members of the Inquiry.  Ultimately, the Chilcot Report does not make findings of law, 
                                                 
35 See Weller (n 10) 133-44. 
36 Chilcot Report (n 7) volume 5, section 5 [199]. 
37 ibid, volume 5, section 6.2 [822-5]. 
38 See Wilmshurst (n 9). 
39 Chilcot Report (n 7) executive summary [439] (emphasis added). 
40 Although, with regard to dubious alternative legal arguments, see McGoldrick (n 10) 67-78. 
  
9 
 
as is to be expected given its mandate; inferring such findings is undoubtedly possible, but such 
an exercise is unhelpfully speculative. 
 
C. The Chilcot Report’s References to International Law 
International law was nevertheless a key element of the Inquiry’s Report.  The Inquiry’s 
commitment to international legal accuracy and clarity is evident throughout.  Irrespective of 
its refusal to make legal determinations, the Inquiry certainly has not been afraid to set out and 
highlight international law to a notable extent.41  For the most part, in so doing, has achieved a 
good balance between legal literacy and accessibility.   
For example, in relation to questions of target selection, the Chilcot Report helpfully 
sets out the key rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL): i.e., distinction, 
proportionality, military necessity and precaution in attack.42  Its summary of these principles 
is not only legally accurate,43 but, moreover, is well filtered and succinctly presented.   The 
Report also provides a similar, albeit more in-depth, summary of the IHL obligations 
concerning the preservation of religious, historic and cultural property.44   
With regard to the crucial question of the ad bellum basis for the 2003 intervention, the 
controversial ‘revival argument’ is accessibly presented and explained in the Report.45  Another 
indicative example of the Inquiry’s approach – in the context of the revival argument – is the 
fact that key provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties46 relating to 
                                                 
41 It is worth noting that the Chilcot Report did not just touch on substantive questions of international law, but 
also British domestic law.  For example, in sections 15.1 and 15.2, there are a number of reflections upon the 
common law duty of care owed by various executive departments and bodies to civilian personnel.  See, e.g., 
Chilcot Report (n 7) volume 11, section 15.1 [320-5, 439-44, 833-7]; and section 15.2 [39-59]. 
42 Chilcot Report (n 7) volume 5, section 6.2 [349-50].  See also ibid, volume 12, section 17 [53] (similarly credibly 
summarising the same key IHL principles, but as applicable to civilian casualties). 
43 See generally Ian Henderson, The Contemporary Law of Targeting: Military Objectives, Proportionality and 
Precautions in Attack under Additional Protocol I (Martinus Nijhoff 2009). 
44 Chilcot Report (n 7) volume 5, section 6.2 [803].  See generally Roger O’Keefe, The Protection of Cultural 
Property in Armed Conflict (Cambridge University Press 2006). 
45 See, e.g., Chilcot Report (n 7) volume 5, section 5 [534-5]. 
46 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (23 May 1969). 
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legal interpretation are reproduced in full.  This provides anyone reading the Report, who may 
not have a background in international law, with a valuable tool with which to undertake 
assessment of the Security Council resolutions that formed the basis of the UK’s legal case.47 
This is not to say that the Inquiry’s engagement with international law was unfailing.  
For example, its offhand summary of the jus ad bellum as the ‘prohibition on the use of force 
except in self-defence or where clearly authorised by the Security Council’,48 while broadly 
accurate, is devoid of nuance and paints a picture that might act to somewhat obscure the 
complex realities concerning the law on the use of force.  Such representations perhaps further 
underscore the view that it would not have been appropriate or desirable for Chilcot to have 
had a mandate to reach concrete legal findings.49   
Nonetheless, for the most part, the way in which the Inquiry has engaged with 
international law – both in terms of depth and accuracy – is pleasing.  Significant international 
legal discourse in the UK regarding the Iraq War has run parallel to the Inquiry’s work, and 
has been fuelled by it.  As Peevers has argued, ‘the Inquiry itself generated a “resurgent” debate 
over Iraq War decision-making and, during the hearings, we perhaps heard more than ever 
before about the legal aspects of the decision to go to war.’50  The Inquiry’s high profile means 
that the admirable care taken in its Report’s representations of international law has the 
potential to improve future engagement with international law by British commissions of 
inquiry, as well contributing positively to the wider social awareness of international legal 
standards in the UK. 
 
3. The Chilcot Inquiry and International Legal Advice 
                                                 
47 Chilcot Report (n 7) volume 5, section 5 [108].   
48 ibid, volume 5, section 5 [574].   
49 See n 19 – n 22 and accompanying text. 
50 Peevers (n 10) 55. 
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It has already been noted that the Chilcot Inquiry was not a body capable of making legal 
determinations and never framed itself in these terms.51  Perhaps as a result, the Inquiry 
perceived one of its roles as not merely being to analyse the ‘content’ of the legal advice given 
to government in relation to the Iraq War, but also to engage with the means and occasions by 
which advice was provided and received.  The legal advice that formed the basis of the 
justification for war is a central element of Chilcot: most notably, section 5 of the Report – 
running to 169 pages and over 70,000 words – is devoted entirely to the question of the advice 
that formed the basis for the UK’s legal case for the intervention,52 although it is important to 
note that questions concerning legal advice (its nature, delivery and reception) are explored 
throughout the Report.53   
Writing in 2009, not long after the Chilcot Inquiry’s creation, Scott and Baird argued 
that it was already the case that the Inquiry had ‘led to unprecedented scrutiny of the role of 
the government legal advisor.’54  Such scrutiny has continued throughout the 7 years of the 
Inquiry’s existence.55  The Chilcot Inquiry has thus, arguably unintentionally, somewhat 
‘democratized’ the nature of the provision of legal advice to governments,56 by bringing public 
attention to certain features of international legal expertise and advice.  The events of the Iraq 
War, with which the Inquiry was concerned, did not merely engage substantive legal questions, 
they also raised existential questions about international law generally.57  Many of the features 
                                                 
51 See n 13 – n 17 and accompanying text. 
52 Chilcot Report (n 7) volume 5, section 5. 
53 See, e.g., ibid, volume 2, section 3.3 [90, 485-502]; volume 5, section 6.1 [301]; volume 5, section 6.2 [351-75, 
713-800]; volume 9, section 10.1 [154-7]; and volume 10, section 11.1 [55]. 
54 Scott and Baird (n 14) ix. 
55 See Peevers (n 10) 55. 
56 Were it not for the creation of the Chilcot Inquiry, which led to the declassification of many government 
documents, it would have likely taken decades for the matter to be truly exposed to public scrutiny, given that the 
1967 amendment of the Public Records Act 1958 (c.51) imposes a 30-year-rule for declassification. 
57 See, e.g., Tom Blass, ‘The Iraq Inquiry’ International Bar Association (6 January 2011) 
www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=6c486ccb-6222-428d-88d7-3e2dcbc5c113 (quoting Anne 
Ramberg, Secretary General of the Swedish Bar Association and Co-Chair of the IBA’s Rule Of Law Action 
Group).  
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of international legal advice and existential questions about international law that fell within 
the Inquiry’s mandate have long been recognised within professional circles,58 but the Chilcot 
Report has uniquely highlighted them and made them a matter of public record.   
The role of the legal adviser, as the name suggests, is to advise.  This, though, begs a 
number of questions, both generally and in relation to the UK’s role in the Iraq War.  For the 
purposes of this article, we briefly touch upon just a few such questions, as manifested in the 
Report: the appropriate recipient of legal advice and its transparency, the timeliness of advice, 
the perception and treatment of law and legal advice by the Government, and the independence 
and quality of that advice.  These particular points are complex and wide-ranging.  As such, 
for sake of brevity, our discussion of them is necessarily selective.  It is, however, worth 
keeping in mind that underpinning the discussions in this section is Chilcot’s ultimate 
conclusion that ‘the circumstances in which it was decided that there was a legal basis for UK 
military action were far from satisfactory.’59 
 
A. The Recipients and Transparency of Legal Advice 
The Chilcot Report highlights the difficulty in determining to whom the legal adviser owes a 
responsibility to provide advice.  Differing perspectives in this regard became notably apparent 
in the course of the Inquiry’s work.  Lord Goldsmith, for example, ‘told the Inquiry that he 
viewed Mr Blair as “ultimately” the client for his advice.’60  In direct contrast, the Cabinet 
Secretary, Lord Turnbull, was of the view that ‘he, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, Chief of the 
                                                 
58 The features of, and the many difficulties faced by, government legal advisers are a frequent theme in the 
literature.  See, e.g., ‘Symposium,  Speaking  Law  to  Power:  International  Law  and  Foreign  Policy’ (2005) 
23  Wisconsin  International  Law Journal  1; Zidar and Gauci (eds) (n 12); and Wickremasinghe (ed) (n 12). 
59 Statement by Sir John Chilcot (6 July 2016) (n 15) 4 (emphasis added). 
60 Chilcot Report (n 7) volume 5, section 5 [159].   
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Defence Staff (CDS), the diplomatic service and others were all clients for Lord Goldsmith’s 
advice.’61 
Chilcot confirms that the acquisition of formal advice in relation to the legality of the 
use of force was deliberately delayed,62 and that early informal legal advice was kept within an 
extremely tight circle of only a few people.63  It is also the case that, once it was finally 
obtained, formal legal advice was not presented to Cabinet in a timely manner.64  The Chilcot 
Report is clear that Mr Blair and Mr Straw in particular acted as conduits between the legal 
advisers and the Cabinet (and other senior officials) in this regard, filtering and controlling the 
flow and quality of information.65 
The Inquiry accepted that, constitutionally, there was no requirement for legal advice 
to be presented to Parliament,66 despite its conventional – if not legal67 – role in decision-
making concerning the use of force (a role that has strengthened notably since the 2003 
intervention).68  The Inquiry also agreed69 with the Mr Blair’s contention70 that government 
was entitled to confidential legal advice.  What the Inquiry took exception to, however, was 
the fact that advice was not communicated to the wider Cabinet and other key officials: it was 
unequivocal in holding that ‘[t]he advice [prepared by the Attorney General] should have been 
provided to Ministers and senior officials whose responsibilities were directly engaged and 
should have been made available to Cabinet.’71  Mr Blair and Mr Straw’s restrictive approach 
                                                 
61 ibid [163] (emphasis added).   
62 See subsection 3.B. 
63 Chilcot Report (n 7) volume 5, section 5 [454-6, 908 and 914]. 
64 ibid [825-85]. 
65 See, e.g., ibid [908]. 
66 ibid 5 [679] (citing Thomas Erskine May, Parliamentary Practice (22nd edn, Butterworths 2001)). 
67 Chilcot Report (n 7) volume 5, section 5 [22]. 
68 The Cabinet Manual: A Guide to Laws, Conventions and Rules on the Operation of Government (Cabinet Office 
2011) [5.36-5.38]; and Constitutional Arrangements for the Use of Armed Force – Constitution Committee, 
Chapter 2: Chapter 3: Parliament’s Role (2003) 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldselect/ldconst/46/4606.htm#a11. 
69 Chilcot Report (n 7) introduction [73]. 
70 ibid, volume 5, section 5 [808]. 
71 ibid [957]. 
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to disseminating legal advice was thus deemed unsatisfactory by the Inquiry: ‘[a]s the Attorney 
General, Lord Goldsmith was the Government’s Legal Adviser not just the Legal Adviser to 
Mr Blair.’72   
Chilcot’s position in this regard must be correct, given that the Cabinet is the ultimate 
decision-making body in the Government regarding the use of force.73  In relation to the Iraq 
War specifically, the restrictive approach to the access to legal advice undoubtedly undermined 
the relationship between the Government and its legal advisers.  More generally, this has wider 
implications for the place of international law in governmental decision-making and the 
domestic democratic rule of law. 
 
B. The Timeliness of Legal Advice 
It is evident from the Report that there was a notable delay in the Government’s seeking of 
formal legal advice, particularly from the Attorney General.74  Indeed, it was not simply the 
case that advice was not sought: despite the willingness of the Attorney General75 (and other 
legal advisers76) to provide it, Lord Goldsmith was instructed not offer a legal response until 
called upon.77  This highlights not only an omission, but also a deliberate choice to block early 
legal analysis of the plans to use military force (plans that Chilcot confirm were firmly in place 
before the end of 2002).78  
The Report certainly implies that the decision to delay advice was undesirable,79 
although it stops short of explicitly condemning it.  This was, perhaps, because Chilcot had in 
                                                 
72 ibid [233]. 
73 Constitutional Arrangements for the Use of Armed Force – Constitution Committee, Chapter 2: The 
Government’s Internal Decision-Making Process (2003) 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldselect/ldconst/46/4605.htm [23-5]. 
74 See, e.g., Chilcot Report (n 7) executive summary [441]; and volume 5, section 5 [38, 63 and 99].  
75 ibid [16 and 119]. 
76 See, e.g., ibid [127]. 
77 ibid [906]. 
78 See, e.g., ibid, executive summary [66-9 and 94]. 
79 See, e.g., ibid [441-57]. 
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mind the fact that a governmental request for the provision of formal legal advice may have 
had wider political and strategic implications in the lead-up to war,80 particularly when it was 
relatively clear that the advice in 2002 would have been that the use of force would be 
unlawful.81  This restriction – in effect a gag order on legal advice – placed the legal advisers 
in an extremely difficult position.82  The FCO legal advisers, for example, were clearly 
perturbed by this obfuscation of legal questions during the initial planning stages of the 
intervention.83  Whereas, the Attorney General was, perhaps unsurprisingly, rather more 
willing to accept the instruction to refrain from providing formal advice in late 2002, and was 
prosaic when discussing it in retrospect.84  
In any event, the deliberate delaying of legal advice (both per se and, then, its 
communication to the Cabinet and other senior officials as discussed in the previous 
subsection) further indicates the worrying marginalisation of legal questions by government 
officials at the time. 
 
C. The Perception and Treatment of Legal Advice 
There is a recurring perception amongst international lawyers that, as advisers, their role is a 
‘marginal’ one: some practitioners have even described their professional role as that of 
‘handmaidens’ of wider socio-political forces.85  The Chilcot Inquiry’s account of the events 
leading up to the 2003 Iraq intervention reflects this perspective to some degree.   
                                                 
80 ibid, volume 5, section 5 [139 and 329]. 
81 See, e.g., ibid [166-96]. 
82 See, e.g., ibid [132-3]. 
83 See, e.g., ibid [127, 133-4 and 139]. 
84 ibid [16, 38 and 909]. 
85 Philip Alston, ‘The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalization’ (1997) 3 European 
Journal of International Law 435; and Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of International Law: Between Technique 
and Politics’ (2007) 70 Modern Law Review 1. 
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At the same time, it is important not to overstate the extent to which legal advice was 
marginalised in relation to the Iraq War.  Chilcot shows us the inner workings of the provision 
of legal advice to the UK Government in unprecedented depth.86  It indicates that there exists 
a high degree of procedural fidelity to the role of such advice, and that notable significance is 
placed upon it.87  This is not merely because of the need to ensure that any particular action is 
taken within the law and is immune from disruptive and destabilising legal disputes, but also 
because supportive legal opinion has the capacity to legitimate decisions and behaviour.88  It is 
important to note that, while Chilcot undoubtedly confirms the marginalisation of legal advice, 
it also – at the same time – shows that legal advisers are an integral element of British 
governmental decision-making, and that this was to an extent true even in relation to the events 
assessed by the Inquiry.   
Of course, Chilcot also highlights, in parallel, a rather uglier, more instrumental view 
of ‘the law’.   It is clear that at least some senior figures in the Government viewed compliance 
with international law in relation to Iraq purely as valuable political and procedural ‘cover’, 
rather than having any inherent value in itself.89  Indeed, such instrumentalisation occurred not 
only in relation to legal advice, but also with respect to the advisers.  One might note, for 
example, the decision to have Lord Goldsmith present the final legal case for war to 
                                                 
86 See Charlotte Peevers, ‘Guest Post Part I: The Chilcot Inquiry – The Publication Saga of an Official History’ 
Opinio Juris (17 February 2015) http://opiniojuris.org/2015/02/17/guest-post-chilcot-inquiry-part-publication-
saga-official-history/.  
87 See, e.g., Chilcot Report (n 7) volume 2, section 3.3 [485-502] (the Inquiry’s apparent implicit acceptance of 
Tony Blair’s claim that the Attorney General’s advice in July 2002 – to the effect a further SC resolution was 
undoubtedly required before any intervention could possibly be lawful – was welcome and had a distinct effect 
on policy, shaping the attempt to obtain what ultimately became resolution 1441); and volume 5, section 5 [140] 
(Mr Blair’s claim that, had advice from the Attorney General unequivocally been that the use of force was 
unlawful, then the UK ‘would have been unable to take action’). 
88 This explains why international lawyers have long been keen on formal separation between law and politics, 
with some even suggesting a more constitutionalist perspective.  See Mattias Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of 
International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 
907. 
89 See, e.g., Chilcot Report (n 7) volume 1, section 2 [164]; volume 2, section 3.4 [34-6].  
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Parliament.90  The Inquiry found this to be an ‘unusual’ practice,91 and stated that responsibility 
for making the legal case to Parliament should have rested with ‘the Minister responsible for 
the policy, in this case Mr Blair or Mr Straw.’92  Chilcot stopped short of saying that this 
‘unusual’ approach was motivated by a desire to stave off awkward legal questions in 
Parliament by presenting a legal fait accompli – an ‘authoritative’ expert view that would be 
difficult for MPs to dispute.  However, the present authors are more willing to speculate in that 
regard. 
The integral nature of the legal adviser to the process of governmental decision-making 
means that the expectations placed on the legal advice given tend to be high.93  Moreover, 
‘integral’ does not necessarily mean ‘integrated’ in this context.  It is evident from the Chilcot 
Report that there was little appetite in the Cabinet to engage with legal analysis.94  The 
prevailing view was that the advice should be in a black and white form – war was lawful or 
unlawful – and any further legal advice was extraneous.95  As a result, legal nuance was lost.96  
From the perspective of the present authors, as international law academics, this is a damning 
finding.  However, it is perhaps reflective of the reality of the role of the government legal 
adviser.97 
What is more concerning – and is a key issue apparent from Chilcot in relation to the 
marginalisation of advice – is that the Inquiry reveals the extent to which legal advice was 
disputed or rejected by those being advised.  The picture painted by the Report is one of outright 
                                                 
90 ibid, volume 5, section 5 [943]. 
91 ibid [943]. 
92 ibid [944]. 
93 See, e.g., ibid [394]. 
94 ibid [952]. 
95 See, e.g., ibid [85, 686, 701, 857-63, 872, 878 and 950]. 
96 ibid [35]. 
97 See, e.g., Sir Franklin Berman, ‘The Role of the International Lawyer in the Making of Foreign Policy’ in 
Chanaka Wickremasinghe (ed), The International Lawyer As Practitioner (British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law 2000) (‘It would be a rare case indeed if a Governmental legal adviser were in a position to 
compel the Government he [or she] serves to act in one way or another…when it comes to action the final decision 
may not be his [or hers]’). 
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hostility, at least in some quarters, towards legal advice that did not clearly support the policy 
goals of the Government.   
International law was seen by some senior officials – both before and after the March 
2003 intervention – as merely a constraining annoyance.98  As such, legal advice was at times 
viewed as being about working around the law’s unhelpful restrictions, and, thus, legal advice 
that was seen as adding to the restrictive nature of the law in any way was dismissed.  This 
perspective is illustrated by Sir John Sawers’ statement in February 2002 that ‘[t]he lawyers 
and peaceniks should not prevent us from saying what we really want in Iraq [i.e., regime 
change].’99   
Another stark example from the period immediately prior to the intervention is Jack 
Straw’s rejection100 of Sir Michael Wood’s warning that a second Security Council resolution 
was required for force to be lawful.101  Mr Straw wrote to Sir Michael stating: ‘I note your 
advice, but I do not accept it.’102  The Foreign Secretary instead drew upon legal advice from 
elsewhere, including from US government lawyers,103 to reach an alternative legal conclusion.  
Similarly, one might note that the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff proposed that Sir Jeremy 
Greenstock be asked to seek alternative (i.e., more agreeable) legal advice to that initially given 
by Lord Goldsmith.104 
These rejections of ‘undesirable’ advice highlight a constitutional tension regarding the 
role of the legal adviser.  The Inquiry noted, for example, Sir Franklin Berman’s view that 
Ministers should not be entitled to cherry pick legal advice to support their preferred policy 
                                                 
98 See, e.g., Chilcot Report (n 7) volume 5, section 6.1 [418].   
99 ibid volume 1, section 3.2, [11-2 and 106-7]. 
100 ibid, volume 5, section 5 [349-54]. 
101 ibid [344-8].  Indeed, Sir Michael went so far as to state that ‘[t]o use force without Security Council authority 
would amount to the crime of aggression.’  ibid [348]. 
102 ibid [351].   
103 See, e.g., ibid [358]. 
104 ibid [197]. 
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option.105  However, the Report did not necessarily endorse this view: it merely juxtaposed it 
with Mr Straw’s contrary assertion that advice was – as it were – advisory,106 and left the reader 
to draw their own conclusions on this point.   
The current authors take the position that it must be correct that the views of legal 
advisers cannot replace government policy, as this would in effect turn them into unelected 
policy-makers.  Mr Blair and Mr Straw (amongst others in the Government) surely possessed 
significant discretionary ‘power’ to treat the legal advice that they had received as they felt 
appropriate.107  The more important question is the manner in which, and the desirability of the 
manner in which, they exercised this power.  On this front, the Chilcot Report is devastatingly 
critical.  The fact that key figures in the Government failed to adequately explain – except in 
terms of their beliefs as to what they thought was right108 – their reasons for rejecting, delaying 
and marginalising formal legal advice (and the fact that Chilcot was able to demonstrate this) 
is telling.  The Inquiry, and the wider social and political legacy of a war that most viewed as 
unlawful, profoundly demonstrate the need to respect the opinions of legal advisers and to 
adequately justify any departure from those opinions. 
 
D. The Quality and Independence of Legal Advice  
This article does not aim to consider the content of the advice provided in relation to the Iraq 
intervention in substantive terms.  Certainly, the advice that the Attorney General ultimately 
provided can and should be questioned, given its departure from the majority opinion amongst 
other Legal Officers and the wider international legal community.  However, in this subsection, 
                                                 
105 ibid [382].   
106 ibid [358]. 
107 This is particularly the case when the authorisation of military action is concerned, as this undoubtedly remains 
one of the prerogative powers of the crown.  See Nigel D White, Democracy Goes to War: British Military 
Deployments Under International Law (Oxford University Press 2009) 19-22.  See also n 73 and accompanying 
text. 
108 See, e.g., Chilcot Report (n 7) executive summary [537]. 
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we are instead concerned with issues affecting the quality and independence of legal advice,109 
particularly with respect to the advice provided by Lord Goldsmith. 
The Attorney General is, of course, the most senior legal adviser to the British 
Government, and his advice is, therefore, in constitutional terms, paramount.110  However, 
while Lord Goldsmith is an eminent lawyer, he does not have specialised expertise in relation 
to public international law (and, particularly, in respect to the jus ad bellum).  Given this, it is 
notable that he formulated his legal opinion on ad bellum issues with input from other Legal 
Officers (notably FCO legal advisers and the UKMIS legal team in New York).111  Such 
consultation and pooling of legal opinion is surely highly desirable, both in terms of broadening 
legal appraisal and engaging subject-specific expertise.  However, the Chilcot Report noted Sir 
Michael Wood’s view that: 
the Foreign Secretary was content for me to send the letter provided I did not include 
in the letter a statement of my own view of the law; and provided that I made it clear in 
the letter that no advice was needed at present. I was not happy with these 
instructions…112 
The suggestion by Mr Straw that FCO legal advisers should not take a position on the law when 
instructing the Attorney General was certainly problematic.  In effect, due to the Foreign 
Secretary impairing communication between legal advisers, the Report also noted that a 
divergence of views amongst Legal Officers ‘crystallised when it became clear that a second 
resolution would not be forthcoming.’113  Clearly it would have been desirable for full and 
                                                 
109 This matter has, quite rightly, already been engaged within the blogosphere. See, e.g., Richard Moorhead, 
‘Independence Play – Chilcot on the Legal Process’ Lawyer Watch (7 July 2016) 
www.lawyerwatch.wordpress.com/2016/07/07/independence-play-chilcot-on-the-legal-process/. 
110 See Chilcot Report, volume 5, section 5 [852]. 
111 See ibid [109-128], volume 2, section 3.5 [1004]. 
112 ibid, volume 5, section 5 [127]. 
113 ibid, volume 2, section 3.5 [1064]. 
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frank communications in this regard to have occurred, and this should have been encouraged 
by government rather than restricted. 
It has long been apparent that in the early months of 2003 there were significant 
changes, ‘in both tone and content’,114 to the legal advice provided by the Attorney General.115  
However, the Chilcot Report painstakingly charts the progression of Lord Goldsmith’s legal 
analysis, exposing it to a huge amount of scrutiny.   
Lord Goldsmith’s preliminary view was he was ‘not optimistic’116 and even 
‘pessimistic’117 about the legal position for military action without a second Security Council 
resolution, and he was clear that a further decision of the Security Council at least was 
required.118  There was then something of a shift, to a position that identified two competing 
legal arguments.  One of these, of course, was that a ‘reasonable case’ could be made for 
authorisation by way of resolution 1441 alone,119 albeit that the Attorney General felt that a 
second resolution was still ‘the safest legal course’120 and that there was no guarantee that a 
court of law – were it ever to consider the question – would find in favour of this position.121  
The final version of the Attorney General’s formal legal advice, famously, was that the ‘better 
view’ was that there was a legal basis for the use of force without a further Security Council 
resolution.122  As is well-known, this third and final legal position – which best aligned to the 
Government’s pre-determined policy course – ‘was the basis on which military action was 
taken.’123 
                                                 
114 Duncan French, ‘Iraq and Climate Change: The Mainstream Lawyer’s Survival Guide’ (2010) 44 International 
Lawyer 1019, 1025. 
115 See, e.g., Andrew Gilligan, ‘Why Did the Attorney General Change His Advice?’ The Spectator (6 March 
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 The Chilcot Report does not shy away from confirming that there was ‘a change of 
view’ on the part of the Attorney General.124  It is not explicit as why this change occurred, 
although it does provide indicative evidence in this regard.  Lord Goldsmith’s view was, for 
example, influenced by ‘the arguments of the US Administration which [he] heard in 
Washington’,125 and by ‘discussions with Mr Straw, Sir Jeremy Greenstock and the US 
Administration’.126   
There was a degree of sustained political pressure placed on the Attorney General 
internally.  In general, this was subtle and indirect, rather than overt.  For example, the question 
posed to the legal advisers became framed in terms of whether a legal case could or could not 
be made, rather than as a request for opinion as to what the strongest legal position was.127  
When the question being asked is changed, of course, it is likely that answers given will change 
too,128 and pressure to provide a ‘clear cut’ answer – from various officials – increased on the 
Attorney General in early 2003.129   
There are numerous other findings in section 5 of the Report that indicate – despite the 
contention of some officials130 – that political pressure was placed on the UK’s legal advisers.  
Mr Straw, for example, directly and expressly challenged some of the initial advice of the 
Attorney General in relation to the assessment of ‘material breach’ of resolution 1441,131 as 
well as rejecting – in a significant, and ‘unusual’,132 exchange with Sir Michael Wood – the 
considered legal position of the FCO’s principal legal adviser.133   The Foreign Secretary also 
noted in February 2003 that, however desirable a second resolution may have been, a 
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127 See, e.g., ibid [85, 563 and 708] 
128 See ibid [117 and 127]. 
129 ibid [686].  See also ibid [85, 701, 857-63, 872, 878 and 950]. 
130 See, e.g., ibid [736]. 
131 ibid [412]. 
132 ibid [359]. 
133 ibid [341-95]. 
  
23 
 
combination of the Government’s policy goals and the diplomatic reality at the UN meant that 
the UK was ‘likely to have to go for something less’,134 a statement of intent that one might 
reasonably assume heaped pressure on the advisers who were presenting an opinion to the 
effect that ‘less’ would be legally insufficient. 
Similarly, the Prime Minister’s private determination to push ahead with the 
intervention in the early months of 2003135 and the specific finding of the Inquiry that he 
expressed concern to Lord Goldsmith that the formal legal opinion that a ‘reasonable case’ 
could be made ‘did not offer a clear indication that military action would be lawful’136 also 
almost certainly contributed to the pressure on the Attorney General and other legal advisers 
to present a strong case for the use of force.  This is especially apparent when it is considered 
that this was combined with the increasing opposition to the war, including from within 
government.137   
Perhaps most notably, Lord Goldsmith confirmed that the key steps of the revival 
argument, in the first instance, ‘had been put to [him]’ by Sir Jeremy Greenstock.138  This 
inverse flow of legal advice – from diplomat to the UK’s most senior legal adviser – may be 
seen as representative of the strong implication in section 5 of the Chilcot Report that 
diplomatic and policy concerns detrimentally influenced the independence of legal advice and, 
as a result, reduced the substantive quality of the advice given.  
 None of this is to say that the Attorney General was not circumspect about the 
importance of his advice remaining independent from political influence.  Lord Goldsmith 
explained his general view about the qualities of legal advice to government, noting, in 
particular, that lawyers should offer advice that they ‘honestly consider to be correct’ and give 
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‘advice they believe in’ and not what ‘they think others want to hear.’139  He further explained 
some of the negative consequences of legal advisers not acting in this independent manner, 
pointing out that this ‘would undermine their function’.140  Nonetheless, it would not seem that 
this goal of maintaining lawyerly independence was adequately realised. 
Overall, therefore, perhaps the most crucial lesson of all to learn from the Chilcot 
Report – in relation to questions of international law – is the need to protect the independence 
of legal advice to governments.  Simply put, our view is that a decision by government to reject 
advice reached independently is a better alternative to allowing legal advice to be pressured so 
as to suit governmental policy.   
Legal advisers do not exist in a political vacuum, and they are, in some respects, slaves 
to two masters: they are required to be conscientious about their specific client – the 
government of the day – but are also interested in broader questions of fidelity to the rule of 
law.  Different lawyers will weigh the balance between these two concerns differently.  
Elizabeth Wilmshurst, of course, famously resigned her post.141  Sir Michael Wood, on the 
other hand – once it was clear that his legal opinion was not going to be accepted – retained 
fidelity to ‘the client’, and shifted from ‘advisory decision-making mode’ to ‘advocacy 
mode’.142 
One cannot reach a conclusion as to a ‘better’ way for these dual responsibilities – to 
the client and to the law – to be reconciled by individuals.   What we would argue is that the 
role of the legal officer, as both adviser and advocate, requires not only that he or she has the 
clearest possible picture of the legal rules, but also involves, at least at times, the formulation 
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of a genuine opinion on how those rules apply and ought to be interpreted.143  To meaningfully 
fulfil this role, legal advisers must be provided with sufficient independence, and the genuine 
opportunity to provide informed expert advice. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this article, we have offered some initial thoughts as to the treatment of international law 
and international legal advice in the recently published Chilcot Report.  The Inquiry did not 
make explicit legal determinations – we argue probably desirably – and, despite the temptation 
to do so, it is dangerous to infer any legal conclusions from its Report.  There are certainly 
some unflinching findings in the Report, such as the already now infamous revelation that the 
Prime Minister wrote to President Bush in July 2002 stating ‘I will be with you whatever’,144 
and the Inquiry’s conclusion that ‘the UK’s actions undermined the authority of the Security 
Council.’145  Chilcot was not the whitewash that some feared.146  Nonetheless, even the 
Report’s most hard-hitting conclusions do not, in themselves, have direct legal implications. 
What the Report did do was engage with international law to a notable extent.  
Moreover, its treatment of international law was, for the most part, both accurate and 
accessible.  This is undoubtedly a positive consequence of the Inquiry’s work, which has 
implications for the wider social appreciation of international legal standards and for the role 
of international law in future commissions of inquiry. 
Far more extensive still was the Report’s consideration of the provision and treatment 
of legal advice.  We have argued that Chilcot demonstrates a worrying trend amongst 
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government officials to marginalise, delay and obfuscate legal advice,147 at least with regard to 
the events considered by the Inquiry.  One must be careful not to overstate this trend, but it was 
undoubtedly a notable aspect of decision-making in relation to the Iraq War.  As the Inquiry’s 
chairperson made clear in his statement accompanying the publication of the Report, ‘the 
circumstances in which it was decided that there was a legal basis for UK military action were 
far from satisfactory.’148  In this article, we particularly stress that crucial lessons to learn from 
Chilcot are the need for officials to respect legal advice (including fully justifying deviation 
from it), and the importance of protecting the independence of the legal adviser. 
                                                 
147 See, e.g., Ministerial Code (Cabinet Office 2015) (making no reference at all to international law). 
148 Statement by Sir John Chilcot (6 July 2016) (n 15) 4. 
